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ABSTRACT
Legal action challenging a company’s advertisement for containing
false or misleading statements is a more recent development in the
American legal system. The market’s utilization of advertising to
promote sales has grown steadily to the point where the frequency
with which it now permeates everyday life is almost constant.
Lawsuits challenging many of these advertisements have increased
as well. The swelling influence of advertisements in the marketplace
and the complementary rise in false advertising litigation is relevant
for both companies and consumers alike. As litigation continues to
grow as an outlet for companies to safeguard their brands,
consumers will find themselves jointly affected. This Note will
analyze a subset of this area known as false comparative advertising.
A false comparative advertisement subjects a company targeted by
that advertisement to repeated injuries in the form of damage to
reputation and loss of goodwill until its broadcast is halted. As a
result, before the underlying false advertisement claim is ever
argued, a plaintiff will first seek to preliminarily enjoin the
defendant from broadcasting the advertisement. A court’s analysis of
a motion for a preliminary injunction will involve four factors. There
is a judicially created practice that has long been recognized in this
analysis that allows a court to presume one of those factors. It
essentially permits a court to presume irreparable harm, one of the
four factors, without the plaintiff producing supporting evidence.
Naturally, it is called the presumption of irreparable harm. The
validity of the presumption is the next frontier facing courts hearing

* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2016; B.S., Smeal College of

Business, The Pennsylvania State University, 2013. I wish to express my sincere
gratitude to Professor Caroline Gentile for her advice and guidance with this Note. I
would also like to give my thanks to my family and friends for their tremendous
support.

933

934

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XX

false advertising cases. This Note will discuss the reasons why the
presumption of irreparable harm should continue to be recognized
within the realm of false comparative advertising litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
“Never write an advertisement which you wouldn’t want your own
family to read. You wouldn’t tell lies to your own wife. Don’t tell them
to mine.”1 David Ogilvy, “The Father of Advertising,”2 emphasized the

1.

DAVID OGILVY, CONFESSIONS OF AN ADVERTISING MAN 99 (1st ed. 1963).
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importance of truthful advertising in his landmark book Confessions of
an Advertising Man.3 Years after Ogilvy issued his ethical stance, the
law prohibiting false advertisements started to take shape.4 Thus far, the
litigation of advertising claims has provided a robust collection of cases
that emphasize how relevant the development of this field is to the
market.
In 1991, Castrol, the world leading manufacturer, distributor, and
marketer of motor oil, filed a false advertising claim against Quaker
State, another leading company in the business of motor oil.5 A Quaker
State commercial claimed that its motor oil protected car engines better
than any other leading motor oil.6 In reality, the tests that Quaker State
used to corroborate its advertising claims did not prove that its motor oil
was superior.7 As a result, the district court issued a preliminary
injunction preventing Quaker State from making the superiority claim,
and the order was subsequently affirmed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.8
In 1998, the Clorox Company (“Clorox”), which produces the wellknown chlorine-based liquid bleach called Clorox, filed a lawsuit
against Proctor & Gamble (“P&G”), the familiar household products
company.9 P&G had implemented an advertising campaign in Puerto
Rico to promote its laundry detergent Ace.10 The goal of the campaign
was to change the prevailing consumer perception in Puerto Rico that
laundry detergent alone would be insufficient to get clothes white, and
that chlorine bleach would be needed.11 P&G claimed that by simply
using Ace, consumers would be able to achieve clothes as white or
2. Constance L. Hays, David Ogilvy, Father of Soft Sell in Advertising, Dies, N.Y.
Times, July 22, 1999, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/22/business/davidogilvy-88-father-of-soft-sell-in-advertising-dies.html.
3. See OGILVY, supra note 1.
4. See Arthur Best, Controlling False Advertising: A Comparative Study of Public
Regulation, Industry Self-Policing, and Private Litigation, 20 GA. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1985)
(noting that advertising regulation was still in its infancy at the time the article was
published).
5. See Castrol, Inc. v. Quaker State Corp., 977 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1992).
6. See id. at 59.
7. See id. at 64-65.
8. See id. at 65-66. Part I of this Note will discuss the use of preliminary
injunctions in a false comparative advertising claim.
9. See Clorox Co. P.R. v. Proctor & Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 29-30
(1st Cir. 2000).
10. See id. at 28.
11. See id.
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whiter than if they used another detergent combined with chlorine
bleach.12 Clorox sought a preliminary injunction on its claim that P&G
was engaging in false advertising based on evidence that chlorine bleach
was the most effective at bringing out the white in clothes.13 Although
the district court initially dismissed the case, on appeal, the First Circuit
determined that Clorox had properly alleged a false advertisement claim
and remanded its preliminary injunction motion.14
More recently, Time Warner Cable (“TWC”), the second largest
American cable provider at the time of the lawsuit, filed a lawsuit
against DIRECTV, one of the largest American direct broadcast satellite
providers.15 DIRECTV launched an advertising campaign based on the
theme of “SOURCE MATTERS,” which attempted to persuade
consumers that DIRECTV delivered a better picture and sound than
cable. Among other multimedia advertisements efforts, DIRECTV
recruited celebrities Jessica Simpson and William Shatner to advocate
this claim in a series of commercials.16 Simpson reprised her role as
Daisy Duke from The Dukes of Hazzard and Shatner revived Captain
Kirk from Star Trek to the delight of many fans, TWC not being one of
them.17 In response, TWC initiated legal action against DIRECTV for its
advertising campaign claims.18 The facts showed that there was no
difference between the picture and sound consumers received from
DIRECTV’s service and that which they received from cable.19 As a
result, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court order preliminarily
enjoining the aspects of DIRECTV’s campaign that made the superior
claims.20

12. In conjunction with its advertising campaign, P&G used the slogan “Whiter is
not possible,” to promote Ace. See id. at 28-29. After the initial complaints from
Clorox, P&G modified its campaign inviting consumers to, “compare with your
detergent,” before the phrase, “whiter is not possible.” See id.
13. See id. at 28.
14. See id. at 39.
15. This lawsuit provides a key example of the relevancy of these claims to the
everyday consumer. See Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144,
148-49 (2d Cir. 2007). This case will be discussed in more detail in Part II of this Note.
16. See id. at 149-50.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 149-51.
19. See id. at 149.
20. The preliminary injunction was affirmed in part for the aspects of the
DIRECTV campaign that were properly challenged. See id. at 163. This included the
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Motor oil, laundry detergent, and television services provide
examples of how false advertising litigation can arise in any industry. 21
In many industries, false comparative advertising is still common. 22
Companies therefore need to remain vigilant in monitoring the
development of this legal field so that they can readily identify
competitor false advertising.23 This is especially important because the
companies involved in the aforementioned cases are household names,
demonstrating just how closely connected these disputes are to the
everyday consumer.24 Its prevalence is the reason the developments in
this practice area are significant for both corporations and consumers.25
This Note will examine one of the current debates in false
advertising claims: the disagreement regarding the use of the
presumption of irreparable harm, a judicially created practice used in the
equitable relief analysis for preliminary injunctions. Part I of this Note
will examine false advertisement claims and the development of the
presumption. Part I will include a comparison to patent infringement
claims and copyright infringement claims, fields that saw a similar
development of the presumption. Part II will discuss the abolition of the
presumption in patent and copyright litigation. The rejection of the
presumption in these fields has led to confusion between courts over
whether it should still be recognized in false advertising litigation. 26 Part
II will therefore introduce the conflicting views that have arisen as a
result of this confusion. Part III will advocate for the continuing

Simpson and Shatner advertisements, but some of its other efforts fell outside of the
scope of a proper false advertisement claim. See id. at 162-63.
21. See Time Warner, 497 F.3d at 148-49; Clorox Co. P.R. v. Proctor & Gamble
Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2000); Castrol, Inc. v. Quaker State
Corp., 977 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1992).
22. See generally Lee Goldman, The World’s Best Article on Competitor Suits for
False Advertising, 45 Fla. L. Rev. 487 (1993) (discussing the competing views on the
incentives a company has to engage in false advertising).
23. See Part I.A for a discussion of the development of the presumption of
irreparable harm. See Part II for a discussion of the changing view on the use of the
presumption.
24. See Time Warner, 497 F.3d 144; Clorox Co. P.R., 228 F.3d 24; Castrol, Inc.,
977 F.2d 57.
25. See infra notes 39-49 and accompanying text (explaining the interests that false
advertising law is designed to protect).
26. See infra Part II.C (introducing cases from the federal courts of appeal that
discussed the validity of the presumption of irreparable harm in false advertising
claims).
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recognition of the presumption in false comparative advertising claims
in order to protect the marketplace.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE HARM IN
FALSE ADVERTISING, PATENT INFRINGEMENT, AND COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS
Preliminary injunctions provide a fundamental remedy to a
corporate plaintiff in false advertising, patent infringement, and
copyright infringement claims.27 A preliminary injunction returns the
dispute to the status quo by freezing a defendant’s questionable
activities during litigation.28 It is an extraordinary remedy and should
never be awarded as a right.29 But it is also a vital remedy that
companies almost always rely upon in false advertisement, patent
infringement, and copyright infringement claims.30 For a company to
obtain a preliminary injunction, it must establish four factors: (1) the
company is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) failure to obtain
preliminary relief will likely cause the company to suffer irreparable
injury, (3) the balance of equities tips in the company’s favor, and (4) an

27. See infra notes 51-55, 83-85, 104-106 and accompanying text (explaining how
the statutory regulations respective to each area of law provides plaintiffs the ability to
seek a preliminary injunction).
28. Status quo is defined as the “last, peaceable, noncontested status of the parties.”
See 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30:50
(4th ed. 2014).
29. A court is advised to take a cautious approach when making a ruling on a
motion for a preliminary injunction. This is rooted in protecting the defendant from
unfair treatment. See id. § 30:30.
30. Compare James E. Clevenger, 44 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 3d 1 False
Advertising Under Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B) § 22 (1997) (“It is relatively common
practice in false advertising cases to seek the entry of a preliminary injunction at an
early stage in the litigation. This is to prevent the continuance of public confusion or
deception being caused by the false advertising [.]”), with Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes
Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that “[w]ithout this
injunctive power of the courts, the right to exclude granted by the patent would be
diminished, and the express purpose of the Constitution and Congress, to promote the
progress of the useful arts, would be seriously undermined”), abrogated by eBay, Inc.
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006), as recognized in Robert Bosch,
LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1148-49 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and 6 William F.
Patry, Patry on Copyright § 22:7 (noting the importance of injunctive relief in copyright
infringement claims).
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injunction is in the public interest.31 The traditional principles of equity
require that a plaintiff demonstrate each of these factors.32 The court has
equitable discretion to grant or deny injunctive relief after a fair
weighing of each of the factors.33
In each of these practice areas, the preliminary injunction analysis
has carried with it a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm, a
judicial tool that shifts the burden for the second factor of the analysis to
the defendant.34 Part I will examine the origin of these causes of action
and how the nature of these claims led courts to adopt a presumption of
irreparable harm. Part I.A will focus on false advertising claims, Part I.B
will focus on patent infringement claims, and Part I.C will focus on
copyright infringement claims.
A. THE FALSE COMPARATIVE ADVERTISEMENT CLAIM
A company engages in false comparative advertising when it
broadcasts an advertisement to the marketplace that contains false or
misleading claims about another company. 35 Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act provides a sword for the targeted company to wield against
those false advertisements.36 More specifically, the statute creates a
federal cause of action for that company by imposing civil liability on an
entity that has falsely advertised.37 When a targeted company is, or
believes it is likely to be, damaged by the representations made in those
advertisements, it can properly bring a section 43(a) action against the
company responsible.38
Allowing a company to invoke section 43(a) to defend itself against
false advertisements is grounded in two fundamental purposes. First, the
31. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); eBay,
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
32. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
33. See id.
34. See infra notes 56, 88, 108 and accompanying text (noting that each practice
area concurrently developed this presumption as a procedural tool for judges to use
when considering the need for equitable relief).
35. False advertising is “an advertising statement that tends to mislead consumers
about . . . one’s own or someone else’s goods, services, or commercial activity.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (10th ed. 2014).
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1)(B) (2012) (although the governing standard for
false advertisement is still commonly referred to as section 43(a), it has since been
codified in the United State Code).
37. See id.
38. See id.
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statute seeks to protect the commercial interests of a company targeted
by a false advertisement.39 That company stands to suffer loss of sales,
damage to business reputation, and loss of goodwill because the false
advertisements will operate to form a false perception about a targeted
company in the mind of the consumer.40 Second, the statute seeks to
protect against consumer deception.41 Failure to eliminate the false
advertisement from the marketplace prolongs consumer exposure to the
false perception.42 Allowing the company responsible for the false
advertisement to continue to broadcast the false or misleading claims
only increases its reach and creates a greater risk of injury to the
targeted company’s commercial interests.43 Thus, by promoting a
marketplace that allows consumers to make purchasing decisions on the
basis of truthful information rather than false perceptions, section 43(a)
works to protect innocent consumers, in addition to the targeted
company.44 Further, the statute guarantees that companies will advance
39. The purpose is “to protect persons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair
competition.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012); see also Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1389 (2014) (“Identifying the interests protected by the
Lanham Act . . . requires no guesswork, since the Act includes an ‘unusual, and
extraordinarily helpful,’ detailed statement of the statute’s purposes.”) (citing Halicki
Prods. v. United Artists Commc’ns, Inc. 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 1987).
40. Today, it is universally understood that false advertising protects against these
injuries. See Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1393 (“[L]ost sales and damage to . . . business
reputation—are injuries [that are] precisely the sorts of commercial interests the
[Lanham] Act protects.”).
41. Although the commercial interests of companies that are targeted by false
advertisements suffer from such false or misleading claims, it is the consumer who is
the real victim. On a day-to-day basis, consumers must rely on advertiser-honesty to
ensure that the information included in the advertisements they see are truthful. With
the bulk of company information coming through advertisements, advertisers have been
able to create specific brand perceptions, whether truthful or dishonest. It is the
dishonest perceptions that false advertising law seeks to prevent. See Jean Wegman
Burns, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under the Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L.
REV. 807, 874-75 (1999) (“[T]he key purpose of any false advertising law is to ensure
that consumers receive accurate information[.]”).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Conopco, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 95 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1996)
(“[T]he public interest underlying the Lanham Act’s prohibition of misleading
advertisement is that of preventing consumer confusion or deception. This interest is
identical to the public’s interest in protecting against trademark infringement.”);
McCarthy, supra note 28, § 27:25 (citing Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661
F.2d 272, 277 (2d Cir. 1981) (“We are therefore reluctant to accord the language of s
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both purposes because in protecting its own commercial interests, a
company automatically guards against consumer deception.45
Accordingly, any relief a consumer receives is directly tied to a
company’s success in its claim.46 Conversely, the Lanham Act does not
operate to protect the interests of the advertiser.47 Allowing an advertiser
to have blanket discretion in what it communicates to the marketplace
does not serve any public policy. 48 In fact, granting blanket discretion
would not only undercut the precise company actions that the Lanham
Act is designed to protect, but would also foster an untruthful market.
Therefore, after balancing these interests, the Lanham Act is supremely
committed to protecting the targeted company and its consumers.49
The Lanham Act provides extensive relief to a company that is
targeted by false comparative advertising.50 A company’s first
opportunity to seek remedial help comes in the infancy of litigation in
the form of a preliminary injunction.51 In the absence of injunctive
relief, the marketplace would be subject to infiltration by false and
deceptive messages thereby undermining the Lanham Act’s policy
goals.52 As a result, this remedy protects a company from further injury
43(a) a cramped construction, lest rapid advances in advertising and marketing methods
outpace technical revisions in statutory language and finally defeat the clear purpose of
Congress in protecting the consumer.”)).
45. Section 43(a) is something of an oddity as consumers have no standing to sue
under the statute yet the statute is designed to protect their interests. See Lexmark Int’l,
134 S. Ct. at 1390 (“A consumer who is hoodwinked into purchasing a disappointing
product may well have an injury-in-fact cognizable under Article III, but he cannot
invoke the protection of the Lanham Act[.]”).
46. See McCarthy, supra note 28.
47. See David H. Bernstein & John Cerreta, eBay & the Presumption of
Irreparable Harm in Lanham Act False Advertising Cases, 27 THE COMPUTER &
INTERNET LAW., no. 11, at 25.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 29 (explaining that the “weighty interests of both plaintiffs and the
public” in a false advertisement suit deserve heightened protection compared to the
limited value in recognizing the advertiser’s interests in “continuing to disseminate
misleading claims”).
50. The Lanham Act allows a plaintiff to recover the defendant’s profits, any
damages the plaintiff has incurred, costs of the action, and attorney fees after
establishing a violation of section 43(a). See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2012). The Lanham Act
also expressly authorizes a court to enjoin the false advertisement. See 15 U.S.C. §
1116.
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116.
52. See Bernstein & Cerreta, supra note 47, at 29 (“To deny injunctive relief after a
finding of false advertising would only allow the deception to ‘continue to seep into the
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that it would otherwise suffer throughout the life of the case.53 This
simultaneously protects consumers by preventing the perpetuation of the
false perceptions the advertiser is hoping to relay to those consumers. 54
Accordingly, preliminary injunctive relief has become the remedy that
most effectively safeguards the market.55
Toward the end of the twentieth century, courts hearing false
advertising claims gradually stopped requiring plaintiffs to prove the
second factor of the preliminary injunctive analysis, opting instead to
grant preliminary injunctions based on the presumption that failure to
enjoin advertisers from their alleged misconduct would cause the target
company irreparable harm.56 This development followed from a
collective acknowledgment of the effect that false comparative
advertising has on those targeted companies.57 Advertisements are
public’s discourse,’ thus ‘undermin[ing], rather than promot[ing], the Lanham Act’s
goal of protecting consumers.’”) (citing PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., No.
3:09-CV-269, 2010 WL 957756, at *3 (E.D. VA. Mar. 12, 2010)).
53. Preliminary injunctions have the ability to “prevent irreparable injury to legal
rights in light of a prediction of the final outcome of the case.” John Leubsdorf, The
Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 565 (1978). They serve to
“stop the bleeding,” and can be a useful tool to prevent any further damage that has
already been done. See Jeffery M. Sanchez, The Irreparably Harmed Presumption?
Why the Presumption of Irreparable Harm in Trademarks Will Survive eBay and
Winter, 2011 BYU L. REV. 535, 535 (2011).
54. See Bernstein & Cerreta, supra note 47.
55. See Goldman, supra note 22, at 492 (“[I]f truthful informative advertising is an
unequivocal social good, false advertising is unequivocally bad. In the short run,
deceptive advertising injures consumers and competitors. In the long run, false
advertising results in a reduction of product quality and misallocation of resources. If
left unchecked, deceptive advertising may eventually undermined the entire competitive
system.”). Moreover, preliminary injunctions are extremely important in protecting the
market interests because of the lengthy process of the American judicial system. As of
2013, the median time interval from filing to disposition of a civil case in which trial
was completed by U.S. District Courts was just over two years. See Judicial Facts and
Figures 2013: Combined Civil and Criminal, U.S. District Courts, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialFactsandFigures/judicial-facts-figures2013.aspx.
56. See Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 211 F.3d 515, 522 (10th Cir. 2000); Porous Media
Corp. v. Pall Corp., 110 F.3d 1329, 1335-36 (8th Cir. 1997); Southland Sod Farms v.
Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1146 (9th Cir. 1997); Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson
& Co., 971 F.2d 6, 16 (7th Cir. 1992); McNeilab, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 848
F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1988).
57. There has been disagreement among courts on the proper section of when it
should apply. See N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1227
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designed to generate a specific message for the consumer, and more
often than not the advertisements reach the target audience.58 When a
company broadcasts a false advertisement, it logically follows that the
falsity has reached the consumer.59
There are two types of false advertisements: “(1) ‘misleading, noncomparative commercials which tout[] the benefits of the products
advertised but ma[k]e no direct reference to any competitor’s product,’
and (2) ‘a false comparative advertising claim.’”60 Non-comparative
advertisements “accrue[] equally to all competitors” in the market so
“some indication of actual injury and causation,” is necessary to prevent
speculation.61 In contrast, a false comparative advertisement necessarily
results in irreparable harm because it diminishes the value of the
targeted company’s product or service in the mind of the consumer. 62
This recognition prompted courts to adopt the presumption of
irreparable harm in false comparative advertisement claims upon a
plaintiff’s successful showing of the first factor in the equitable relief
analysis.63 Nevertheless, the presumption is rebuttable, in that it is

(11th Cir. 2008) (indicating that some district courts employ language that might
indicate a broader application of the presumption to both false comparative
advertisements and false non-comparative advertisements, but characterizing that use as
improper); see also Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 273 (4th Cir. 2002)
(comparing the two types of false advertisements that have seen the use of the
presumption); Bernstein & Cerreta, supra note 47 (noting that some courts have limited
the presumption to false comparative advertisement claims while other courts have
endorsed the expanded view and urge plaintiffs to seek the presumption in all false
advertising litigation). Cognizant of the broad scope of advertising messages that give
rise to a section 43(a) claim, some courts have restricted the use of the presumption to
disputes involving comparative advertisements. Where non-comparative advertising is
concerned, the presumption’s rationale loses merit because the connection between the
advertisement and damage is suspect. A competitor misleading consumers about its
product is not necessarily damaging to another competitor’s reputation or goodwill.
See, e.g., Castrol, Inc., 977 F.2d at 62; McNeilab, Inc., 848 F.2d at 38.
58. See McNeilab, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 501 F. Supp. 517, 530
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
59. See id.
60. See Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis S.p.A., 760 F.3d 247, 259 (2d Cir. 2014)
(citing McNeilab, Inc., 848 F.2d at 38).
61. See McNeilab, Inc., 848 F.2d at 38.
62. See id.
63. If a plaintiff can establish likely success on the merits of the case, or, in other
words, that the defendant has likely engaged in false advertising, then a court would be
within its power to presume that irreparable harm is going to result from that conduct.
See Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 211 F.3d 515, 522 (10th Cir. 2000); Porous Media Corp. v.
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merely a burden shifting mechanism allowing the defendant to produce
evidence refuting the existence of irreparable harm.64 Following a
determination on the presumption, the court must complete the equitable
analysis by fairly balancing each of the four preliminary injunction
factors.65
The use of the presumption has been further justified by the innate
difficulty in establishing irreparable harm in false advertising
litigation.66 A company’s loss of sales is not wholly attributable to a
competitor’s false advertisement because of a variety of factors that
affect a company’s top line.67 Therefore, the use of loss of sales as a
benchmark for establishing irreparable injury is speculative and
inconsistent.68 Likewise, “it is virtually impossible to ascertain the
precise economic consequences of intangible harms, such as damage to
reputation and loss of goodwill, caused by [Lanham Act] violations.”69
The fact that a plaintiff would be required to prove by some metric the
existence of these injuries at an early stage of litigation only exacerbates
the difficulty of being successful.70 The presumption alleviates these

Pall Corp., 110 F.3d 1329, 1335-36 (8th Cir. 1997); Southland Sod Farms v. Stover
Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1146 (9th Cir. 1997); Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co.,
971 F.2d 6, 16 (7th Cir. 1992); McNeilab, Inc., 848 F.2d at 38.
64. See Abbott Labs., 971 F.2d at 18.
65. See id. (“Finding that . . . injuries are irreparable only would mean that [the
plaintiff] has cleared the second preliminary injunction threshold; the wisdom of
granting preliminary relief would then depend upon the discretionary weighing of all
four preliminary injunction factors.”).
66. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (indicating that the harm that
results from false advertising is intangible, and, as such, cannot readily be identified).
67. Change in price points, public relations, and new market entrants are a few
examples of the many market variables that influence the fluctuation of a company’s
sales. The presence of these market variables makes the use of loss of sales a
speculative injury. See generally Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d
186 (2d Cir. 1980) (providing a practical look at how a court will determine whether a
company has in fact suffered loss of sales).
68. See id.
69. See Abbott Labs., 971 F.2d at 16.
70. Ascertaining these injuries at a later stage of litigation is difficult itself. See id.
Further, pressuring the plaintiff to demonstrate the effects of an advertisement on its
reputation and goodwill with even less time simply increases the difficulty. See
Bernstein & Cerreta, supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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concerns for a plaintiff and plugs the gap that otherwise would be very
difficult to fill.71
B. THE PATENT INFRINGEMENT CLAIM
Patent infringement occurs when a company elects to make, use,
offer for sale, or sell the patented invention of another company.72 The
Patent Act creates a federal right of action when patent infringement
occurs.73 The right granted to a company by a patent is “the right to
exclude” a competitor from appropriating its patent.74 If a company has
a valid patent and a competitor has infringed upon that right, it can seek
redress by taking legal action against that competitor.75
The justification for the creation of patent law is derived from the
“Science” prong of the United States Constitution’s explicit grant of
authority to the federal government to promote the “Arts and
Sciences.”76 Congress carried out this task by awarding patents to
inventors.77 Patent rights promote innovation by promising inventors the
exclusive right to enjoy the fruits of their labor.78 This incentivizes
inventors to place their products into the market.79 In turn, consumers
are able to enjoy the increased flow of technological developments into
the marketplace.80 Patent law therefore strikes a balance between
rewarding inventors for investing time and money to develop new
71. See Bernstein & Cerreta, supra note 47, at 28 (noting that “[t]he presumption
also has the effect of making provisional relief a more viable option for plaintiffs in
false advertising cases”).
72. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
73. See id.
74. See id. § 154.
75. See id.
76. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
77. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
78. Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
79. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 610 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d
Cir. 1979) (“The purpose of [a patent] . . . is to provide an incentive for private
enterprise to devote resources to innovative research, to make the investments required
to put new inventions into practice, and to make the benefits of the invention available
to a wider public.”).
80. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (“First, patent
law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it promotes disclosure of inventions,
to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to practice the invention once
the patent expires; third, the stringent requirements for patent protection seek to assure
that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public.”).

946

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XX

technologies and satisfying the public’s interest in obtaining access to
that innovation.81 The schematics of patent law provide the proper
incentives to foster a competitive market by maintaining this balance
between incentivizing innovations and captivating the public interest
with the prospect of cutting-edge technological developments.82
In order to uphold the interests underlying patent law, the Patent
Act affords an avenue of legal recourse for a plaintiff whose patent has
been infringed.83 Similar to false advertising, a plaintiff can seek
preliminary injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant’s use of the patent.84
A preliminary injunction protects the exclusive rights of an inventor for
the duration of the litigation, thereby upholding the public policy
underlying patent laws.85 Specifically, patent holders’ ability to enjoin
infringers during the early stages of litigation affords the holders the
opportunity for full enjoyment and protection of their patent rights
without undue delay.86
In patent infringement litigation, the equitable analysis for
preliminary injunctions is identical to the analysis employed in false
advertising claims.87 Courts began to recognize a presumption of
irreparable harm for patent infringement claims around the same time
courts recognized this presumption in false advertisement claims.88 The
rationale underlying this development when assessing claims of patent
81. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)
(“From their inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance
between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and
refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very
lifeblood of a competitive economy.”).
82. See id.
83. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
84. See id.
85. A patent holder has a clear interest in protecting the right granted by patent
during litigation instead of waiting for a final judgment on the merits especially given
the average length of civil litigation. See U.S. District Courts, supra note 55.
86. See Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (indicating the importance of preliminary injunctive relief in patent infringement
claims), abrogated by eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006),
as recognized in Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1148-49
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
87. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
88. The presumption in patent law developed toward the end of the twentieth
century and witnessed a rise in prominence during the same time it experienced a
similar rise in false advertising law. See Smith Int’l, 718 F.2d at 1573.
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infringement was grounded in the understanding that once infringement
on a valid patent has been established, the exclusive right attached to
that patent is undoubtedly impaired.89 Accordingly, if a plaintiff makes a
clear showing of patent validity and infringement, a court will presume
irreparable injury.90 Nevertheless, it is not the case that every patent
infringement injury is irreparable given that it often can be compensated
by money damages.91 It is only when monetary relief is insufficient for
the resulting harm that it will be irreparable.92 Regardless of the
possibility of money damages, the presumption became a consistent
feature of preliminary injunctive review in all patent infringement
disputes.93
C. THE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CLAIM
A copyright grants the creator of an original work that is fixed in a
tangible medium the exclusive right to use and distribute that work. 94
Copyright infringement occurs when another company or person uses or

89. See id. at 1581 (explaining with regard to the irreparable harm analysis, “[t]he
very nature of the patent right is the right to exclude others. Once the patentee’s patents
have been held to be valid and infringed, he should be entitled to the full enjoyment and
protection of his patent rights. The infringer should not be allowed to continue his
infringement in the face of such a holding.”).
90. See id. (“We hold that where validity and continuing infringement have been
clearly established . . . immediate irreparable harm is presumed. To hold otherwise
would be contrary to the public policy underlying patent laws.”); see also Roper Corp.
v. Litton Sys., Inc., 757 F.2d 1266, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The presumption rests on a
strong showing that a valid patent is being infringed. When that is true, irreparable
injury may be presumed. When, as here, infringement is neither actually occurring nor
is reasonably likely, the basis and need for the presumption crumbles.”).
91. See Douglas Lichtman, Irreparable Benefits, 116 YALE L.J. 1284, 1288 (2007)
(noting that “[p]atent harms are not literally irreparable—most patent-related injuries
can be fully compensated by some ex post cash payment—but they are typically
deemed irreparable because patent harms are difficult for courts to value”).
92. See id.
93. The Federal Circuit established a precedent for district courts over the valid use
of the presumption of irreparable harm when it endorsed the presumption first in Smith,
and then in later cases, continuing to reiterate its validity. See Polymer Techs., Inc. v.
Bridwell, 103 F.3d 970, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Roper Corp., 757 F.2d at 1272. The
Federal Circuit ultimately declined to recognize the presumption in Robert Bosch. See
Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d 1142.
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (listing the various uses of a copyright that are
exclusively granted to the owner).
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distributes that work without authorization.95 The Copyright Act grants a
federal right of action for copyright owners, who properly register their
copyrights, to protect their intellectual property against infringers. 96 If a
company owns a valid copyright and a competitor has copied the
original elements of the copyrighted work, the company can enforce its
exclusive right by initiating litigation against that competitor.97
The basis for the development of copyright law is derived from the
same provision of the Constitution that warrants the creation of patent
law.98 Copyrights fall under the “Arts” prong of the federal
government’s authority to promote the “Arts and Sciences.”99 On the
surface, copyright protection is aimed at providing a “fair return for an
‘author’s’ creative labor.”100 However, this return is a stepping-stone to
achieve the overriding purpose of copyrights: the stimulation of artistic
creativity for the benefit of society. 101 As a result, copyrights are an
efficient way to promote the fairness that is owed to those creators of
original works while fostering a more diverse collection of works for the
public good.102 Copyright law therefore seeks to maintain the balance
between the interests of artists and the interests of the public in order to
advance the constitutional goals of promoting the “Arts.”103
In order to uphold the interests underlying copyright law, the
Copyright Act provides remedies to those who have been subject to

95.
96.

See id. § 501.
See id. Although a common-law copyright exists, the presumption of
irreparable harm developed in federal courts, which can only hear those claims that are
supported by a valid federal copyright registration. This Note focuses on those federal
claims. See Catherine Palo, 77 Am. Jur. Trials 449, Copyright Infringement
Litigation § 3 (2000).
97. See, e.g., Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
99. See id.
100. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432
(1984).
101. See id. (“But the ultimate aim is . . . to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good.”).
102. See id.
103. See id. at 431-32 (“The limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory
monopoly . . . reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative
work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve
the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other
arts.”).
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infringement.104 Preliminary injunctions are again the first opportunity a
plaintiff has to seek relief from the court.105 This remedial tool is useful
for a plaintiff to prevent future infringement and restore the exclusive
rights that were originally guaranteed with the copyright. 106 As such,
preliminary injunctions play a crucial role in copyright litigation.107
The presumption of irreparable harm developed concurrently in
copyright infringement cases with its counterpart in patent infringement
cases.108 If a plaintiff is able to make a prima facie case for copyright
infringement, courts have presumed that the plaintiff would suffer
irreparable harm.109 A copyright owner is guaranteed the exclusive right
to use and distribute an original work.110 It follows that a copyright
owner suffers harm by virtue of the loss of an exclusive right once this
right has been invaded.111 This intangible injury has justified the basis
for courts to recognize the presumption in copyright law.112 Essentially,
courts rationalized the use of the presumption because “a claim of
copyright infringement inherently means irreparable harm exists.”113
Although this rationale does not apply with equal force in all copyright
disputes, nearly all of the federal courts of appeal recognized this
presumption of irreparable harm in copyright infringement claims.114

104.
105.
106.

See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2012).
See id. § 502.
See Patry, supra note 30 and accompanying text (indicating the importance of
preliminary injunctive relief in copyright infringement claims).
107. See Patry, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
108. See Patry, supra note 30, § 22:44 (noting that all but the Fifth Circuit has
applied the presumption).
109. See 17 U.S.C. § 502.
110. See id. § 106.
111. See Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir.
1977), abrogated by eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006), as
recognized in Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 74-75 (2d Cir. 2010).
112. See Patry, supra note 30, § 22:50 (“The rationale for the presumption is based
on copyright’s intangible nature, a fact from which courts extrapolate that there is
difficulty in establishing the financial impact of the alleged infringement.”).
113. See Patry, supra note 30 (noting that courts used circular reasoning to justify
the use of the presumption).
114. See Patry, supra note 30, § 22:50 (“Certainly as a per se rule [the presumption]
is false: innumerable copyright disputes are only about money.”).
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II. eBAY AND THE DOWNFALL OF THE PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE
HARM
The debate over the validity of the presumption of irreparable harm
came to a head following the United States Supreme Court decisions in
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. and Winter v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.115 These cases have led to the abolition of the
presumption in patent infringement claims and copyright infringement
claims.116 Consequently, there are now growing doubts as to the
legitimacy of the presumption in false advertisement claims.117 Part II.A
introduces eBay and Winter, the pivotal Supreme Court cases that
review the standards for the equitable analysis for preliminary injunctive
review. Part II.B examines the extension of eBay and Winter to
preliminary injunctive review in patent infringement claims and
copyright infringement claims. Part II.C then considers the debate over
the applicability of eBay and Winter to preliminary injunctive review in
false advertisement claims.
A. THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR THE PRESUMPTION
This section will introduce the Supreme Court decisions that
prompted the beginning of the elimination of the presumption.
1. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.
In 2006, the Supreme Court considered an appeal of the Federal
Circuit’s grant of a permanent injunction in the patent infringement case
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.118 MercExchange is a limited
liability company that invents business method patents and assigns them
for use by other businesses.119 MercExchange owned a business method
patent for an electronic market that facilitated transactions between

115. See Bernstein & Cerreta, supra note 47, at 27 (describing the debate over the
continuing validity of the presumption of irreparable harm in intellectual property
disputes following eBay and Winter).
116. See infra Part II.B (introducing the cases that first articulated the extension of
eBay and Winter to patent infringement claims and copyright infringement claims).
117. See infra Part II.C (analyzing the two circuit court decisions that disagree over
whether the presumption is still valid in false advertising claims).
118. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
119. See id. at 390.
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private individuals.120 They entered into negotiations to license that
patent to the popular online auction website eBay, and its wholly owned
subsidiary Half.com.121 The companies were unable to reach an
agreement.122 Subsequently, MercExchange believed that eBay and
Half.com started using its patented invention and filed a patent
infringement suit in the Eastern District of Virginia. 123 A jury found in
favor of MercExchange, determining that an award of damages was
appropriate because eBay and Half.com had infringed upon
MercExchange’s valid patent.124 MercExchange submitted a post-trial
motion for permanent injunctive relief to prevent further infringement
by eBay and Half.com, but the district court denied the motion after
determining that the presumption was rebutted because irreparable harm
will never result when a patent holder is “willing to license its patents”
or has a “lack of commercial activity in practicing patents.”125
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the decision by applying
“the general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against
patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.”126 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine the appropriateness of this rule.127
The Supreme Court determined that neither of the lower courts had
properly applied the traditional principles of equity.128 In doing so, the
Court held that a plaintiff must satisfy the four-factor test for permanent
injunctions.129 The Court emphasized this rationale by indicating that “a
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 390-91.
The court determined that the fact that MercExchange was willing to license its
patent and was not going to commercially use the patent was conclusive evidence it
would not suffer irreparable harm. See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F.
Supp.2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
126. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit did not see reason to depart from
this general rule. The Federal Circuit did not believe exceptional circumstances were
present that would allow for a departure. Without reference to the remaining factors, the
court issued an injunction after finding in favor of the plaintiff on the first factor. See
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated,
547 U.S. 388, remanded to 188 Fed. App’x 993 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
127. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
128. See id. at 390-94.
129. See id. In condemning categorical rules, the Court stated, “this Court has
consistently rejected invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with a
rule that an injunction automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been
infringed.” Id. at 392-93 (emphasis added).
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major departure from the long tradition of equity practice should not be
lightly implied.”130 As a result, the Court banned the use of “categorical
rules” that result in the automatic issuance or denial of a permanent
injunction in “patent disputes no less than in other cases governed by
such standards.”131
2. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
In 2008, the Supreme Court considered the appeal of a preliminary
injunction award in the environmental case Winter v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.132 Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”)
is an environmental action group that litigates against environmentally
damaging activities.133 NRDC claimed that the U.S. Navy’s use of sonar
in training exercises conducted in the water off of southern California
was causing serious injuries to the thirty-seven species of marine
mammals that lived in those waters in violation of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969.134 NRDC filed suit against the Navy
seeking an injunction to prohibit the use of sonar in future training
exercises.135 The district court issued a preliminary injunction, and the
court of appeals affirmed, holding that “when a plaintiff demonstrates a
strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits, a preliminary injunction
may be entered based only on a ‘possibility’ of irreparable harm.”136 The
130.
131.

See id. at 391.
At trial, the district court had determined that the presumption of irreparable
harm was rebutted because it found that the plaintiff’s uses of the patent made
injunctive relief inappropriate. The Supreme Court discouraged the district court’s
suggestion that injunctive relief should never issue under a “broad swath of cases.”
However, the Court did not discuss the district court’s underlying use and recognition
of the presumption of irreparable harm. The Court viewed the court of appeals’
elicitation of the general rule to grant permanent injunctions whenever a valid patent is
infringed as a categorical rule. The Court found that these rules conflicted with the
principles of equity requiring a plaintiff establish each factor of four-factor injunctive
relief test. See id. at 393-94.
132. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
133. See About, Natural Resources Defense Council, http://www.nrdc.org/about
(last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
134. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 12-15.
135. See id. at 17.
136. The lower courts did not use a presumption of irreparable harm in the
injunctive relief analysis, and the Supreme Court’s review was limited to whether the
lower courts had placed a high enough burden on the plaintiff in establishing irreparable
harm. See id. at 21.
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Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the appropriateness of the
preliminary injunction.137 The Court found that the “possibility” of
irreparable harm as a standard was “too lenient,” and could lead to
judicial speculation.138 The Court endorsed a stricter standard, requiring
that injunctive relief “only be awarded upon a clear showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”139 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff must establish that irreparable harm is “likely.”140
The Court determined that regardless of the standard implemented, the
determination of this factor was unnecessary as the other equities
weighed in favor of denying the motion.141
B. THE END OF THE PRESUMPTION IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS AND
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS
The Supreme Court did not expressly address the validity of the
presumption of the irreparable harm in either of its decisions.142
Furthermore, eBay concerned a permanent injunction in a patent dispute
while Winter involved a preliminary injunction in an environmental
dispute.143 This caused courts hearing motions for preliminary
injunctions in patent infringement claims and copyright infringement
claims to struggle over whether the Supreme Court’s reasoning in these
cases extended to the applicability of the presumption.144 This section

137.
138.
139.

See id. at 20.
See id. at 22.
A clear showing here requires that the plaintiff show not just that irreparable
harm is possible, but that it is likely. See id.
140. See id.
141. In discussing the injury, the Court indicated that the naval activities did not
present unknown effects on the environment because the activities had been taking
place for the past forty years. Furthermore, the Court indicated that there was no
documented episode of injury to the marine mammals. The “possibility” standard
would allow for remote or suspect injuries, such as these, to satisfy the burden. See id.
at 22-24, 33.
142. See id. at 20-22; eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393-94
(2006).
143. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 12; eBay, 547 U.S. at 390-91.
144. “It remains an open question ‘whether there remains a rebuttable presumption
of irreparable harm following eBay’[.]” See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543
F.3d 683, 702 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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explores the cases that have extended the rationale of these Supreme
Court decisions so as to abolish the presumption.145
1. Salinger v. Colting
In 2010, the Second Circuit affirmatively stated that the rationales
of eBay and Winter extended to copyright infringement claims in
Salinger v. Colting.146 J.D. Salinger, author of the famous The Catcher
in the Rye (“Catcher”), has never permitted adaptations of his works.147
Frederik Colting wrote 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye, a
story about Holden Caulfield, Salinger’s main character, sixty years
after the events of Catcher.148 Consequently, Salinger initiated legal
action against Colting for copyright infringement and sought a
preliminary injunction.149 The district court granted the motion.150 In
doing so, it determined that Salinger had presented a prima facie case of
copyright infringement that permitted a presumption of irreparable
harm.151 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court’s
decision holding that the rationale in eBay “applies with equal force to
(a) preliminary injunctions (b) that are issued for alleged copyright
infringement.”152 The court bridged the gap between permanent
injunctions and preliminary injunctions through Winter, stating that its
rationale reinforced the applicability of eBay.153 The court reasoned that
the eBay opinion did not limit its application strictly to patent contexts

145. For patent infringement claims, the Federal Circuit is the only appellate court
with jurisdiction to hear patent claims, therefore Robert Bosch necessarily becomes
binding precedent in all preliminary injunctive cases in the patent context. See Robert
Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1148-49 (Fed. Cir. 2011). For
copyright infringement claims, Salinger is the first circuit court to extend the rationale
in eBay. See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
146. See Salinger, 607 F.3d 68.
147. See id. at 71.
148. See id. at 71-72.
149. See id.
150. See id at 74.
151. See id. (noting that the district court recognized the prevalence of eBay, but
determined that because it had yet to be extended to copyright cases in the Second
Circuit, the presumption was valid).
152. The court engages in a discussion about the relevance of earlier Supreme Court
cases that indicate that the Supreme Court did not view patent and copyright
infringements “as different in kind.” See id. at 77-78.
153. See id. at 78.
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and that the traditional principles of equity apply in any context. 154
Therefore, the court endorsed its view that the presumption fell outside
of the traditional principles of equity for copyright infringement claims
and it has since been abolished in the Second Circuit in this context.155
2. Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp.
In 2011, the Federal Circuit eliminated the use of the presumption
in patent infringement claims in Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon
Manufacturing Corp.156 Robert Bosch, LLC (“Bosch”) holds patents for
different aspects of windshield wiper technology. 157 Pylon
Manufacturing Corporation (“Pylon”) is a competitor of Bosch that sold
similar windshield wipers.158 Bosch filed suit in the district court for the
District of Delaware alleging patent infringement because of Pylon’s
commercial activities.159 A jury found in favor of Bosch after
determining that Pylon had infringed upon the valid patents of Bosch. 160
Bosch subsequently filed a motion for permanent injunctive relief,
however the court held that Bosch did not satisfy the burden of
establishing irreparable harm.161 On appeal, the Federal Circuit
considered the impact of eBay on the presumption in determining
whether an injunction should be issued in patent infringement claims. 162
The Federal Circuit determined that “eBay jettisoned the presumption of
irreparable harm as it applies to determining the appropriateness of
injunctive relief.”163 Accordingly, Bosch established a precedent in not
recognizing a presumption in patent infringement claims.164

154.
155.
156.

See id. at 77-78.
See id.
See Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1148-49 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
157. See id. at 1145.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. The district court referenced the presumption of irreparable harm and eBay, but
did not go into detail on why the presumption was no longer available to a plaintiff
seeking an injunction. See Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 748 F. Supp.2d
383, 407 (D. Del. 2010), rev’d, 659 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
162. See Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1148-50.
163. See id. at 1149.
164. This holding is now binding precedent in all patent infringement claims. See
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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C. THE END OF THE PRESUMPTION IN FALSE ADVERTISEMENT CLAIMS?
The circuit courts have not agreed on whether the presumption of
irreparable harm in false advertisement cases survives the decisions of
eBay and Winter.165 This section will introduce the debate regarding the
validity of the continued recognition of the presumption of irreparable
harm.166
1. Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc.
In 2007, the Second Circuit considered the validity of the
presumption in Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc.167 The case
involved two of the giants in the multichannel service industry, Time
Warner Cable (“TWC”) and DIRECTV.168 TWC, as a cable provider,
must receive a franchise from a local government before it can operate
in that locale.169 DIRECTV, on the other hand, is not similarly restricted
because it broadcasts directly via satellite.170 Because of this market
structure, satellite providers undeniably become direct competitors with
cable providers.171 DIRECTV began an advertising campaign that did
not mention any cable provider by name, but instead made claims about
165. The abolition of the presumption of irreparable harm in patent infringement
claims was foreseeable insofar as eBay is in fact a patent case itself. The similarities
between the underlying claims in eBay and Bosch make the jump a small one.
Moreover the leap to copyright in Salinger is logical given the similarities between
patent and copyright laws. Alternatively, while the presumption that is applied in false
advertising cases is the same as that which was abolished in Bosch and Salinger, the
underlying claim is not the same as eBay. This has caused conflict between and trouble
for the circuit courts that have had the opportunity to review preliminary injunctions
against false advertising. See infra Part II.C.
166. See Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir.
2014); Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 161-62
(2d Cir. 2007).
167. Time Warner, 497 F.3d at 144.
168. See id. at 148
169. TWC owned a franchise in the greater part of New York City. See id.
at 148-49.
170. See id. at 149.
171. The franchise gives TWC a pseudo-monopoly, which means that it is the main
cable provider in a given locality. TWC’s pseudo-monopoly restricts all other cable
competitors, but it does not restrict satellite providers. Therefore, as a matter of fact, the
fiercest competitor a cable company that has a franchise will face is a satellite provider
that can overstep the privileges that come with that franchise. See id.
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DIRECTV’s superior picture quality to “cable” in general.172 TWC filed
suit alleging that DIRECTV’s campaign constituted false advertising in
violation of section 43(a) because the campaign misled consumers into
believing that DIRECTV actually had superior quality, when in fact
there was no difference.173 TWC subsequently filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction against DIRECTV’s campaign.174 In affirming
the district court’s grant of the motion, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reiterated the validity of the presumption “where the case
presents a false comparative advertising claim [because] ‘the
concerns . . . regarding speculative injury do not arise.’” 175 However,
the court endorsed an expanded view of the presumption, recognizing it
both where the advertisement expressly mentions a competitor’s name
and where it does not mention the competitor by name, but consumers
would understand the advertisement as referring to that competitor.176 In
doing so, the Second Circuit took the opportunity to reiterate why the
principles underlying the presumption apply equally in both instances;

172. DIRECTV’s advertising campaign consisted of three different advertisements:
a commercial starring Jessica Simpson, a commercial starring William Shatner, and
internet advertisements, all of which compared the quality of its own services to cable
in general. See id. at 149-51.
173. Although the advertisements all stated this in one way or another, the most
egregious example came at the conclusion of the commercials where a voice-over
stated, “[f]or picture quality that beats cable, you’ve got to get DIRECTV.” Although
they were subsequently revised, the commercial still implied an essence of superiority
over cable. See id. at 150.
174. Before the motion was filed, the companies entered into negotiations, which
resulted in a stipulation wherein DIRECTV agreed to halt any transmission of its
original advertisements, among other things. They subsequently created revised
advertisements that led to TWC seeking the preliminary injunction. See id. at 151.
175. In reviewing the motion, the district court determined that TWC had
established the first factor requiring that the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits
of the case, and turned to the irreparable harm prong. The court reiterated the precedent
of the Second Circuit and the underlying rationale for the presumption. See id. at 162
(quoting McNeilab, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 848 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1988)).
176. Although the court noted that irreparable harm couldn’t be presumed when the
defendant is not mentioned by name, it ruled that the presumption of irreparable harm
applied in this scenario because TWC was essentially synonymous with “cable” in the
markets where it was the franchisee. Therefore, even though they were not mentioned
by name, consumers in those markets would understand the advertisements to be about
TWC. See id. Alternatively, the court recognized that when a false advertisement does
not expressly or impliedly reference a competitor’s product, it would not have the
diminishing effect that a comparative advertisement inflicts, thereby making the
presumption speculative. See id.
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namely that the presumption causes little concern over speculative
injury because “a false ‘comparison to a specific competing product
necessarily diminishes that product’s value in the minds of the
consumer,’” when the consumer recognizes the advertisement to refer to
a competitor.177 The court did not discuss the effect eBay or Winter
might have on the presumption.178 Ultimately, the court granted TWC
the preliminary injunction against DIRECTV’s advertising campaign.179
The reasoning in Time Warner has survived Salinger, and it has guided
the court in continuing to recognize the presumption of irreparable harm
in false advertising claims.180
2. Ferring Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
In 2014, the Third Circuit received its opportunity to answer the
question of whether the presumption continues to exist in Ferring
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.181 The case
involved
Ferring
Pharmaceuticals
(Ferring)
and
Watson
Pharmaceuticals. (Watson), two competing pharmaceutical companies
that manufacture competing progesterone products, hormonal drugs that
help women become pregnant and maintain their pregnancies.182
Ferring’s product, Endometrin, and Watson’s product, Crinone, are the
only U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approved vaginal
progesterone inserts.183 Before the dispute, Watson hosted an
invitational event where it paid consultant Dr. Kaylen M. Silverberg to
deliver two presentations to medical professional invitees during which

177. Since a false comparison will necessarily lead consumers to take a different
view of the product then before they had seen the advertisement, no proof of injury is
necessary. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis S.p.A., 760 F.3d 247, 259-61 (2d Cir. 2014)
(holding that the presumption applied when the competitor is expressly mentioned in
the advertisement and when the competitor is not expressly mentioned, but the
advertiser and competitor operate in a two-player market).
181. See Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 212-14 (3d Cir.
2014).
182. See id. at 206.
183. Endometrin is delivered in capsule form, whereas Crinone is a gel delivered via
applicator. See id. at 207.
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he made statements regarding both Endometrin and Crinone.184 Ferring
subsequently filed suit alleging that the statements constituted false
advertisements in violation of section 43(a) because the statements
mislead medical professionals about the efficacy, reputation and risks of
their product.185 Ferring submitted a motion for a preliminary injunction
to enjoin Watson from further statements and for corrective
advertising.186 The district court denied the motion, refusing to entitle
Ferring to the presumption of irreparable harm.187 On appeal, the Third
Circuit was faced with a case of first impression, as it had never before
awarded a plaintiff a presumption of irreparable harm when reviewing a
motion for a preliminary injunction.188 The court’s opinion was guided
by the principles of eBay, Winter, and Salinger.189 The court utilized
Salinger as a vehicle to rationalize the extension of eBay to false
advertisement claims.190 In an attempt to rebut this extension, Ferring
highlighted an inherent distinction between patent or copyright
184. Medical professionals who were given an access password were also able to
view the presentations online. See id. at 207. Ferring was concerned with three of Dr.
Silverberg’s statements: (1) his statements after referencing to a “Black Box” warning
which indicates to the medical community that a product carries significant risk of
serious or life-threatening effects; (2) his statements after referencing to a patient
preference survey indicating that patients overwhelmingly preferred Crinone over
Endometrin; and (3) his statements after referencing to studies of Endometrin’s efficacy
for women over the age of thirty-five. See id. Dr. Silverberg subsequently
acknowledged that the statements when referring to these three items were incorrect
with regard to what the items actually stated. See id. at 206-10.
185. See id. at 207.
186. See Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., No. 12-cv-05824
(DMC)(JAD), 2013 WL 1405226 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2013).
187. After refusing to recognize the presumption, the district court found that
Ferring did not allege enough facts sufficient to show that it would suffer harm. See id.
at *4.
188. The court acknowledged that other circuits had previously recognized the
presumption for false advertisement claims, and that it had recognized the presumption
for trademark infringement claims. See Ferring, 765 F.3d at 210.
189. Of importance here is that the Second Circuit issued its decision in Time
Warner Cable three years prior to its in Salinger decision. The court in Salinger did not
review the standard stated in Time Warner Cable because neither the parties nor the
district court raised the issue. See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77 n.6 (2010). The
Second Circuit subsequently endorsed the Time Warner Standard for false comparative
advertising claims in Merck. See Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis S.p.A., 760 F.3d 247,
259-61 (2d Cir. 2014).
190. The court used Salinger to indicate that eBay is not strictly limited to the patent
context, thereby allowing for its extension to the false advertising context. See Ferring,
765 F.3d. at 213-14.
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infringement and false advertising: “the injury arising from patent or
copyright infringement can generally be measured in monetary terms . . .
[while] injury to goodwill and reputation [arising from false advertising]
‘is real but difficult to measure in dollars and cents.’”191 However, the
court was not persuaded by this argument, indicating that the rationale in
eBay and Winter is focused on the proper framework for injunctive
relief, and not the underlying claim.192 Thus, the Third Circuit declined
to recognize the presumption of irreparable harm for false advertisement
claims.193 In turn, the court imposed on Ferring the burden of
demonstrating a likelihood of irreparable harm if the injunction were not
granted.194 The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the
motion after determining that the evidence Ferring produced was too
speculative to overcome the burden.195 This case represents not only a
stark contrast to the holding in Time Warner Cable, but also the first

191. See id. at 215 (quoting 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note 28, § 30:47); see
generally supra Part I (discussing the similarities between patent and copyright
infringement claims).
192. The court opined that the rationale in eBay was not unique to patent cases, and
rather that injunctive relief must be granted in accordance with the traditional principles
of equity. The court bolstered its opinion with the line of reasoning seen in Winter. The
court gave little, if any, weight to Ferring’s argument. See Ferring, 765 F.3d at 215-17
(disagreeing with Ferring’s argument that eBay does not apply to Lanham Act cases
because the court believed that the unique characteristics of patents did not factor into
the ultimate holding and using Winter to reinforce this conclusion).
193. See id. at 217.
194. See id.
195. Ferring submitted a declaration from Dr. Angeline N. Beltsos that stated: “(1)
Dr. Beltsos and other doctors would be less likely to prescribe a drug if they believed it
contained a Black Box warning; (2) Dr. Beltsos and other doctors would be less likely
to prescribe a drug if patients in the marketplace generally preferred another drug; and
(3) Dr. Beltsos and other doctors would be less likely to prescribe a drug if it was not
effective for a particular age group.” Id. at 217. The court found this declaration to be
speculative because she stated that these types of statements “may influence” her
professional decisions, and, moreover, nothing in the declaration indicated that she had
changed her prescription rate of Endometrin. See id. at 218-19. Furthermore, the court
gave significant weight to Dr. Silverberg’s certifications that he would refrain from
making the offending statements in the future and that no evidence was produced to
support the fact that the statements were still available, or would later be made
available, in the marketplace, notwithstanding the fact that Watson itself had not
certified that it would refrain from making any of these statements in the future. See id.
at 217-18.
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extension of eBay by a circuit court to abolish the use of the
presumption in a false advertisement claim.196
III. LONG LIVE THE PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE HARM
Part II introduced the debate about whether the presumption of
irreparable harm should continue to exist in false advertisement cases in
the wake of eBay and Winter. Part III argues that it should continue to
be recognized where a false comparative advertisement is at issue. Part
III.A discusses why the presumption in false advertisement cases is
consistent with eBay and Winter. Part III.B examines the market
interests in a false advertisement case that ground the presumption in
sound policy. Part III.C will then argue that the presumption applied by
the Second Circuit in Time Warner Cable is properly designed to
address the interests of the Lanham Act while operating within the
equitable framework endorsed by the Supreme Court.
A. THE PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE HARM IS CONSISTENT WITH eBAY
AND WINTER
The presumption in false comparative advertisement cases can
continue to be recognized because it is consistent with the holding in
eBay.197 In eBay, the Court forbade the use of a categorical rule that
would override the four-factor equitable analysis and result in an
automatic denial or issuance of an injunction.198 The presumption does
not operate as a categorical rule during either the individual
determination of irreparable harm or in the resulting outcome of the
analysis.199 When determining whether irreparable harm has resulted,
the presumption is rebuttable, thereby allowing the defendant to defeat it
by offering counter evidence.200 Thus, the presumption standing alone
196. See id. at 214. Contra Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d
144, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2007) (offering an opposing view to the continued recognition of
the presumption of irreparable harm in the limited context of comparative false
advertising claims).
197. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (explaining that the presumption
operates within the equitable framework as opposed to overriding it, which is at the core
of the argument in favor of recognizing that the presumption is consistent with eBay).
198. See supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text (analyzing the Supreme
Court’s disagreement with the lower courts’ holdings, which involved elements that
were contradictory to the traditional principles of equity).
199. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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does not result in an automatic determination because the rebuttal option
serves as a safeguard.201 In turn, the presumption must be fairly balanced
against an examination of the other factors of the equitable analysis. 202 A
categorical rule would override this analysis resulting in an absolute
outcome dependent on one factor.203 The presumption merely governs
the second factor of the analysis, allowing for the four-factor test to be
the final referee.204 As a result, the presumption does not parallel a
categorical rule.205 The fact that eBay does not criticize the district
court’s underlying use of the presumption reinforces this view.206 It
follows that presumptions that operate within the equitable analysis
framework are not a departure from the traditional principles of
equity.207 Thus, the presumption is an appropriate tool that can be used
within the framework set out in eBay.208
Likewise, the Supreme Court’s holding in Winter does not threaten
the presumption’s legitimacy.209 Winter held that a plaintiff’s burden of
establishing the “possibility” of irreparable harm was too lenient and
that the plaintiff must satisfy the burden by showing that it is “likely.”210
This decision does not reinforce an extension of eBay or stand in its
shoes to accomplish the same result because the Court did not determine

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
Compare supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (indicating that the
presumption does not foreclose the potential for a defendant to defeat a motion for a
preliminary injunction), with supra notes 125-26, 129-31 and accompanying text
(detailing the rules that the Supreme Court deemed to be categorical, which had
resulted in automatic outcomes on the motion for a preliminary injunction in both of the
lower courts).
206. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (highlighting the fact that the
Supreme Court did not discuss the district court’s underlying use of the presumption,
but rather its suggestion that injunctive relief would never be appropriate under certain
circumstances).
207. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text (analyzing the Supreme Court’s
holding in Winter that for a plaintiff to be entitled to relief they have the burden of
proving the likelihood of irreparable harm).
210. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
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that the presumption itself was “too lenient.”211 Instead, Winter
expressly speaks to the burden of establishing irreparable harm, not to a
presumptive tool that shifts that burden.212 The distinction of the
presumption from the domain of Winter is bolstered by the Court’s
desire to prevent future courts from granting an injunction on
speculative facts.213 The presumption does not give rise to judicial
speculation because irreparable harm necessarily results from a false
comparative advertisement.214 In light of this, it can be said that the
injury is not only likely, but it is certain.215 Therefore, the presumption is
consistent with Winter because it is not a speculative burden
requirement itself, but rather a burden shifting mechanism based on
established norms.216
B. POLICY REASONS FOR CONTINUED RECOGNITION
The market interests that false advertising law is designed to protect
provide sound policy reasons for the continued recognition of the
presumption in false comparative advertisement claims. On the other
hand, patent law and copyright law lack the necessary market interests
to justify its future use.
False advertisement law does not seek an equal balance of market
interests.217 The Lanham Act’s goal of protecting the market by
promoting a truthful one pushes in favor of a presumption that would
211. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting that the presumption was
not up for review by the Supreme Court and the ruling was limited to the proper
standard for the burden of proof for preliminary injunctions).
212. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (indicating that the Supreme Court
seemed to have concerns regarding the issuance of a preliminary injunction based on an
improperly low burden for establishing irreparable harm).
214. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (analyzing the reason why false
comparative advertisements provide a unique legal landscape in which the presumption
can operate without speculation).
215. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
216. Compare supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (indicating that the
presumption is merely a burden-shifting mechanism), with supra notes 136-40 and
accompanying text (describing the issue before the Supreme Court in Winter and how
the decision is directed at preventing the issuance of a speculative preliminary
injunction by increasing the threshold level for establishing irreparable harm, a question
very different from whether a burden-shifting mechanism is valid).
217. See supra notes 39-49 (indicating that the Lanham Act has the fundamental
purpose of protecting the interests of the targeted company and the injured consumer
compared to those who decide to violate its mandates).
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give assistance to a party with interests aligned with that goal. 218 Two
factors emphasize the difficulty in supporting these interests in the
absence of the presumption. First, the harm from a false comparative
advertisement necessarily results whenever the false message is
conveyed to consumers.219 The presumption should not violate any sense
of equity because it presumes an injury that can legitimately be
presumed.220 Second, without access to the presumption, a plaintiff is
faced with the notoriously difficult burden of establishing an injury from
false advertising.221 A company would be so limited in its ability to
prove this and succeed in its pursuit of a preliminary injunction that the
market would be forced to endure the perpetuation of false perceptions
until the conclusion of trial thereby increasing the costs imposed upon
the market.222 Given that the injury to the market occurs every time the
false message is conveyed to a consumer, this result is so contrary to the
policies underlying false advertisement law that it should violate a sense
of equity.223 Therefore, if the market interests are to be duly supported,
the recognition of the presumption will provide the first line of defense
in guarding those interests in a fashion that still operates within the
equitable framework.224
Patent law and copyright law are both concerned with a much more
equitable division of interests.225 Accordingly, a court must actively seek
an equal playing field between the parties when determining whether to
grant a preliminary injunction lest it set off that balance. 226 Presuming
irreparable harm in these contexts would unwarrantedly tip the scales in
favor of the plaintiff.227
218.
219.
220.
221.

See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (describing the almost
insurmountable burden that a plaintiff must overcome to establish irreparable harm
resulting from false comparative advertisements at such an early stage in litigation).
222. See supra notes 52-55 (describing that the heightened burden is bad for the
market because both the plaintiff and consumers will be subject to the false
advertisement if the plaintiff cannot overcome that burden).
223. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
225. For an analysis of the interests underlying patent law, see supra notes 76-82
and accompanying text. For a similar analysis in copyright law, see supra notes 98-103
and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 76-82, 98-103 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 76-82, 98-103 and accompanying text.
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In the patent context, the elimination of the presumption is aligned
with a legal regime that supports an equal balance of interests.228 Two
factors justify its elimination. First, the existence of a patent
infringement claim is not determinative evidence that the patent holder
has suffered irreparable harm.229 The use of the presumption would
afford an unwarranted advantage to the plaintiff. 230 Second, this
advantage would be conferred in a context where the underlying
interests seek a fair balance between the parties.231 The presumption
would redistribute the weight afforded to the underlying interests of
patent law, giving undue protection to the patent holder thereby
offsetting the balance of interests.232 The abolition of the presumption
instead restores the desired fairness aligned with the balance that patent
law is intended to promote.233
The abolition of the presumption in copyright infringement is an
easy jump from patent infringement given the similarities between the
two fields.234 Two analogous factors underscore the justification for
prohibiting the presumption in this context. First, because of the variety
of uses of a copyright, the existence of an infringement claim is not
always dispositive evidence of irreparable injury. 235 The diverging uses
of a copyright restrict the acceptance of a presumption that would
assume injury regardless of the use.236 Second, the interests underlying
copyright law support a position in favor of requiring the moving party
to establish irreparable harm.237 A presumption would impede the
accomplishment of copyright law’s desire for an equal balance of
228. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (describing the equal balance
between affording protection to inventors who have expended effort in the pursuit of
innovation and increasing public access to that innovation).
229. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (explaining that a plaintiff can be
made whole when the litigation concerns a matter where the defendant has committed
past infringement, and that future infringement is the limited space where patent
infringement could be irreparable).
230. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text (describing the equal balance of
interests that copyright law has been designed to promote).
235. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (noting that there are many
copyright disputes that are simply about money, which would foreclose the possibility
of irreparable harm).
236. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
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interests because it would shift the initial fairness of the litigation in
favor of the plaintiff.238 Without the presumption, the interests will be
appropriately weighed against each other allowing copyright law to
promote its goals in the complementary fashion that the law intends. 239
Accordingly, the presumption is an unnecessary tool to achieve the
goals of the Patent Act and the Copyright Act, unlike its indispensability
to the achievement of the goals of the Lanham Act.
C. THE STANDARD TO BE RECOGNIZED BY COURTS GOING FORWARD
The presumption that most dutifully protects the market interests in
a false advertisement claim without violating eBay or Winter is the
standard employed by the Second Circuit.240 Recognition of the
presumption in all false advertisement cases has been advocated in a few
courts and has scholarly recognition, yet blanket recognition is not
feasible.241 Presuming that any time there is a false advertisement, there
is a corresponding injury would operate as a highly speculative tool that
doubles as a categorical rule.242 Alternatively, a plaintiff should be
entitled to a rebuttable presumption within the equitable framework
limited to the two categories identified by the Second Circuit.243 The
first category results from an advertiser broadcasting a message that
contains an express comparison to a competitor.244 The second category
occurs when the advertiser does not expressly mention the competitor,
but the market is structured in such a way that a consumer would
238.
239.
240.

See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text (analyzing the rule set forth by
the Second Circuit).
241. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining the disagreement that has
been seen in courts regarding the correct scope of the presumption of irreparable harm
between whether it should be limited to false comparative advertising claims or whether
it is appropriate to use it in all false advertising claims).
242. See supra notes 126-31, 136-41 and accompanying text (analyzing the rules at
issue in eBay and Winter that gave rise to the concerns over the validity of the
presumption and whether its use is consistent with the decisions).
243. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (describing the two areas in which
the Second Circuit has approved the continued use of the presumption). Although the
Second Circuit expressed doubt about the presumption in Salinger, the court
subsequently reaffirmed the framework set out by Time Warner in Merck for false
comparative advertisement claims. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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reasonably believe the message to be about that competitor.245 The
rationale for the presumption under the first category applies with equal
force to the other because a competitor’s goodwill and reputation will
necessarily be damaged whenever a consumer recognizes that the
advertisement is a comparison between the two companies.246 As a
result, a court can effectively use the presumption under this framework
to alleviate the foregoing concerns of the balance of interests in a false
comparative advertisement claim while staying within the realm of eBay
and Winter.247
CONCLUSION
The continued recognition of a rebuttable presumption of
irreparable harm is the next challenge facing courts hearing false
advertisement claims. This Note introduced the related areas of patent
law and copyright law that have seen the abolition of the presumption in
the wake of eBay and Winter. Abolishing it in false advertisement
claims for the same reasons is not only wholly unnecessary, but would
render immaterial the very policies that ground the law. In upcoming
decisions, courts should continue to recognize the presumption in false
comparative advertisement claims when the advertisement expressly
identifies the plaintiff, or when it is clear that a reasonable consumer
would infer the advertisement to be targeted at the plaintiff. Limiting the
use of the presumption to these two areas will ensure that it promotes
the welfare of the market interests in a manner that fully complies with
the framework endorsed by eBay and Winter. A preliminary injunction
remains the essential remedy for both the company and the consumer,
and the presumption used in this fashion will ensure that the preliminary
injunction does not become obsolete in false advertising.

245.
246.
247.

See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 197-216 and accompanying text (explaining why the use of the
presumption of irreparable harm is consistent with eBay and Winter).

